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core constitutional values. These include the suppression of
free speech during World War I and the Palmer Raids that
followed, the internment of Japanese-American citizens
during World War II, and the persecution of Communists
during the 1950s. Each time we have vowed not to repeat
the error.
In this context the issue of the current administration's
proposed military tribunals raises issues of law and policy
that should concern everyone who values our constitutional
structure. If we respond no better than before when confronted with the same challenge, we are guilty of hypocrisy
today and weaken our justice system for tomorrow.
Fortunately, we have the legal and historical knowledge
needed to improve upon the past. The question is not one of
intellectual resources, but of political will.

The order: legal Swiss cheese
On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush
issued the military order "Detention, Treatment, and Trial
of Certain Non-citizens in the War Against Terrorism." One
of its provisions authorizes the trial by military commission
of any noncitizen as to whom the president determines "that
there is reason to believe that such individual ... has
engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts
of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor,
that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to
cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its
citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy." It
pronounced that "military tribunals shall have exclusive
jurisdiction with respect to offenses by" such individuals,
who "shall not be privileged to seek any remedy.., in any
court of the United States."
Although a few commentators initially supported the
president's action, fuller analysis showed it to be riddled
with legal flaws. (See, e.g., Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Inter Armes Silent Leges: In Times of
Armed Conflict, Should the Laws Be Silent? (2002) (available at www.abcny.org).)
It is uncontroversial that the armed conflict that followed
America's incursion into Afghanistan was, legally, a war;
the hostilities were between organized military forces representing the incumbent governments of internationally recognized states. Under the Geneva Conventions, the Taliban
combatants detained by the United States in Afghanistan

Eric M. Freedman is a professor of constitutionallaw and legal
history at Hofstra UniversitySchool of Law He is the authorof
Habeas Corpus: Rethinking the Great Writ of Liberty (NYU Press,
2001), which discusses the Bollman case at length.

Illustration by Tom Herzberg

are prisoners of war and subject to trial at our hands only
for (a) war crimes, or (b) while in captivity, for ordinary
crimes, but only if given the same process as would one of
our soldiers. Tardily and grudgingly, our government has
now recognized these elementary principles.
The purpose of the order-and its danger to the rule of
law-is that it seeks to extend this battlefield justice system
to persons who would otherwise be entitled to the protections of the civilian justice system. The order's key predicate is that the United States is engaged in a war not just
against the forces of the now-unseated government of
Afghanistan, but also against the al-Qaeda organization.
Although the U.S. government refuses to give prisoner-ofwar status to al-Qaeda's captured members, two key
propositions follow. First, al-Qaeda members may be
detained until the end of hostilities. Second, its operatives
are guilty of war crimes when they commit acts of terrorism. And, as all agree, war crimes may be prosecuted
before military tribunals.
However attractive politically, these are very questionable legal propositions. Al-Qaeda is not a state nor are its
agents soldiers, any more than are those of the Colombian
drug cartel. The "war against terrorism" is not one likely to
have a defined and documented conclusion. (See Katharine
Q. Seelye, Rumsfeld Backs Plan to Hold Captives Even if
Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2002, at A18 (secretary
of defense suggests "that prisoners could be held indefinitely, not just until the end of the war in Afghanistan, but until
the end of the war on terrorism-which could take years";
says determination will be made by president).) If, as Bush
administration spokesmen have suggested, the laws of war
need to be modernized to deal with current conditions, the
changes should be made through a reasoned process, and,
in any event, could not be applied ex post facto.
Appropriately, the Supreme Court has specifically held
that if the president chooses to use the military to enforce
federal law this does not turn the resulting conflict into a
"war" for constitutional law purposes. (The Prize Cases, 67
U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863).) Nor does it suspend our
international law obligations to provide due process to
aliens. (See Jordan J. Paust, AntiterrorismMilitary
Commissions: CourtingIllegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1
(2002) (outlining provisions of international law transgressed by order).)
Yet among its many other violations of fundamental
standards of domestic and international law (see
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Arts.
14, 15(l), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 9, 1966)) the order:
1.) did not limit the authority of military tribunals to war
crimes nor to areas where the civilian courts were not functioning (But see Ex ParteMilligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120-26
(1866));
2.) permitted the commissions to render judgment on the

basis of "such evidence as would," in the opinion of a
legitimacy not on how they confront Israel but on how well
majority of its members, "have probative value to a reasonthey prepare their people for the future, are being impeded.
able person." (But see Richmond v. Rogers, 365 U.S.
And retrograde Arab regimes, like Syria, Saudi Arabia, or
540--41 (1961) (prohibition against use of involuntary
Iraq, can now feed their people more excuses why not to
statements is "not because such statements are unlikely to
reform." (Thomas L. Friedman, The Hidden Victims, N.Y.
be true but because the methods used to extract them
TMES, May 1, 2002, at A25.)
offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our
Yet inflicting these wounds upon ourselves is as unneccriminal law");
essary as it is counterproductive. In recent years the govern3.) placed no limits on the permissible length of pretrial
ment has successfully prosecuted, through ordinary criminal
detention (Cf Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 446
trials in federal district court, the 1993 World Trade Center
(1963) (detailing abuses pracbombers, those who attacked
ticed during pretrial confineour embassies in Africa, and
ment)) and left the final decithose who conspired to blow
sion as to the disposition of
up a series of public targets in
"I
each prisoner in the standardNew York City. In each
less and unreviewable discrew h
instance, an independent jury,
tion of the president or the
a skeptical press, and a vigorsecretary of defense; and
ous defense team at trial and
4.) gave the latter official
on appeal to a neutral judiciacontrol over the selection of
ry showed our system workdefense counsel and over
ing at its best.
access to the proceedings. (But see Richmond Newspapers
If the government lacks confidence that its evidence is
v. Virginia, 488 U.S. 555, 580 & n. 17 (1980); Association
probative enough to meet constitutional standards, it should
of the Bar of the City of New York, The Pressand the
not be prosecuting at all. In flatly refusing in recent months
Public'sFirstAmendment Right to Terrorism on Trial: A
to extradite suspects who might face military tribunals here,
Position Paper(2001) (available at www.abcny.org).)
such allies as Spain and Germany have pointedly reminded
us why that is so. Due process protections are not simply
A political shot inthe foot
impediments to getting the guilty punished; they are
More broadly, as ABA Criminal Justice Section chair
designed in the first instance to determine with accuracy
Ronald C. Smith pointed out in the Winter 2002 issue of
who is, in fact, guilty of what.
this magazine, conducting such trials before military triEdwin Meese once famously said that the concept of an
bunals, even if legal, would be tragically misguided public
innocent suspect is "contradictory" because "if a person is
policy. We should seek a path, as Edmund Burke said in
innocent of a crime, then he is not a suspect." (See Howard
discussing the American Revolution, defined not by "what
Kurtz, Meese Says Few Suspects Are Innocent of Crime,
a lawyer tells me I may do; but what humanity, reason, and
WASH. POST., Oct. 11, 1985, at A6.) But the rest of us might
justice tell me I ought to do."
think it prudent to safeguard against the possibility that
If we are indeed at war, what values are we fighting for?
when the Marines snatched someone off a foggy plateau in
Are we now announcing that when the chips are really
Afghanistan they apprehended the eponymous cousin of the
down due process is simply an unaffordable luxury that
person actually on their list (passing entirely the question of
unacceptably retards reaching a predetermined result? In
how the person made it onto the list in the first place).
that case, why should an ordinary citizen of an Arab counEven when the rules of due process are fully in place,
try whose government takes the same view believe that its
our system makes mistakes. Ask Dr. Wen Ho Lee, the scijustice system is any worse than ours? To abandon our core entist wrongly accused of spying in 1999 at the Los Alamos
values in times of stress is to confess that we lack confiNational Laboratory. Ask any of the 100 innocent people
dence in them.
who have been released from Death Row over the last 25
If we abdicate in this way the long-term negative effects
years. Then ask the secretary of state (who in more ordinary
will far outweigh any short-term benefits. Such a desertion
times is to be found complaining about the abysmal stanunder fire both assists the propaganda efforts of our adverdards of other countries' justice systems) how he plans to
saries, which-whatever our own views of the truth-have
explain the execution of a foreign national that turns out to
already been shockingly successful worldwide, and weakhave been wrongful.
ens fledgling democracies whose development furthers our
Nor should those of us lucky enough to be American citinterests as well as our ideals. "Progressive Arab states, like izens succumb to the comfortable delusion that we
need
Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain, which want to build their
have no concern with being subjected to this result-oriented
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process. Although the Bush order applies only to aliens
(including the many millions of taxpaying, law-abiding, and
productive legal aliens), that limitation is a purely selfimposed one. Even if it remains in place through this crisis
(as the administration assures us that it will), there is no
legal reason why it need exist in the next one. If the use of
military tribunals is constitutional in these circumstances,
then it is constitutional as to American citizens as well (see
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942) and any legal or
practical precedents that are established now will apply
accordingly.
So too, permitting the government today to exercise
wartime powers to fight al-Qaeda will make it all the
more difficult tomorrow to
forbid it from using the same
powers against radical envi-

ronmental groups, violent

(e.g., providing for a unanimous rather than two-thirds vote
for a death sentence) illusory. To be sure, it is also possible
that these improvements are supplements to, rather than
repudiations of, the order and hence binding on the government (see, e.g., U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96
(1974)). But as long as the right to answer to such questions remains with the executive branch itself, some of the
central provisions of the regulations may turn out to be
ones "that palter with us in a double sense, that keep the
word of promise to our ear, and break it to our hope."
(WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 5, sc. 8).
Third, in apparent frustration at being unable to meet
even its own modest standards for bringing charges against
the vast majority of the individuals it has in detention,
the government has begun
floating ideas for even more
questionable actions, such as
basing convictions on memE
bership in al-Qaeda, independent of the person's connection to any particular act.
(See Neil A. Lewis, U.S.
Weighs New Doctrinefor
Tribunals, N.Y TIMEs, April 24, 2002, at Al.) Legally, this
attempt to rely upon constitutional law developed in the
context of the Smith Act prosecutions of Communists that
began in the 1950s (e.g., Scales v. U.S., 367 U.S. 203
(1961)) is highly dubious in light of subsequent developments (e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 393 U.S. 444 (1969)).
But that does not seem to be a particularly weighty factor
in the government's decision making. Hence, lawyers who
cherish constitutional values must remain alert to see that
they are preserved.

I Co ng res s should
enact d u process

anti-abortion activists, or
right-wing militias.
Perhaps under the impact
of similar commentary (and,
no doubt, after belatedly seeking the advice of competent
internal counsel), once it had
issued the order the Bush administration showed little inclination to actually convene a military tribunal. Moreover, the
tribunal regulations that the government eventually published (Department of Defense, Military Commission
Order No. 1, March 21, 2002) seemed to ameliorate some
of the key constitutional concerns (e.g., by providing that a
not guilty finding could not be changed to guilty on
administrative review (Sec. 6(H)(2)). But there are at least
three reasons why lawyers concerned with the functioning
of the criminal justice system should not drift off into
complacency.
First, significant deficiencies persist, including those
named in points numbered 1-3 above, in contravention of
both domestic and international law (see Amnesty
International, Memorandum to the US Government of the
Rights of People in US Custody in Afghanistan and
GuantanamoBay, April 2002, at 39-62). Notably, the regulations still deny independent judicial review of convictions
or sentences. Indeed, the administration remains unwilling
to have any legal issues at all adjudicated by an ordinary
court system, whether civilian or military, and clearly contemplates that all decisions will ultimately be at the discretion of the president.
Second, commentators who have praised the regulations
may not have read far enough through them. Section 7(B)
provides: "In the event of any inconsistency between the
President's Military Order and this Order, . . . the provisions
of the President's Military Order shall govern." This could
render the putative improvements made by the regulations

,)tees.
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Congress and the courts
One persisting theme in the chorus of criticism of the
order was that the administration acted without congressional involvement, creating a series of avoidable legal and
political problems. And it is predictable that there will, at
some point, be additional congressional hearings on the
entire subject.
This prospect raises both opportunities and dangers. On
the positive side, if military tribunals are to be used at all,
Congress can and should enact the very useful set of due
process guarantees-including Supreme Court reviewthat the ABA House of Delegates overwhelmingly called
for at its Midyear Meeting in Philadelphia. (Res. 8C; see
Bar Group Defies Administration in Voting for Limits on
Tribunals, N.Y. T1MES, Feb. 5, 2002, at A 12.)
But Congress cannot always be trusted to act wisely.
That body is as likely to seek to restrict as to expand the
rights of suspected terrorists. If it does, the judicial system
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may need to rethink a basic constitutional limit on legislative power.

Boliman:a loaded weapon
The Suspension Clause of the Constitution provides:
"The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it." (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
cl. 2.)
This provision reflects the fact that when the country
was founded habeas corpus was universally known and
celebrated as the "Great Writ of Liberty"; during the ratification debates Federalists and anti-Federalists alike vied
to praise it.
The reason is straightforward. The availability of habeas
corpus means that if an individual is found to have been
unlawfully imprisoned the court can release him or herenforcing the rule of law and frustrating governmental
oppression. Attempts to extend the range and efficacy of the
writ, thus, have been for
centuries inseparable from
i
attempts to secure justice
for those who find themselves execrated by the
dominant forces in society-for example, those
who are alleged to have
some connection to some
activity that the government considers supportive
of "terrorism."
In light of this background, everyone agrees that a statute
explicitly providing that a particular class of prisoners shall
not have access to habeas corpus is a suspension whose
legitimacy is subject to judicial testing. (As for the president, he or she has no right at all to suspend the writ, which
is why the White House counsel now agrees that detainees
under the order will have access to judicial reviewnotwithstanding that the order purports to deny access to
"any remedy ... in any court of the United States" and that
the regulations do not address the issue.) (Cf Alberto R.
Gonzales, MartialJustice, Full and Fair,N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
30, 2001, at A27. ("The order preserves judicial review in
civilian courts. Under the order, anyone arrested, detained
or tried in the United States by a military commission will
be able to challenge the lawfulness of the commission's
jurisdiction through a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal
court").)
The difficulty arises when Congress has been silent or
has created some new form of detention (e.g., a hypothetical "terrorism hold" on the say-so of the U.S. attorney general) and, in the same legislation, denied detainees access to
judicial review. In such circumstances it could be argued

I
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that since no writ was available in the first place, Congress
had not suspended it.
Given the importance that all of the Framers placed upon
the Great Writ, and the fact that English courts had the
inherent power to issue it unless Parliament had passed an
affirmative act of suspension, this would seem to be a weak
argument indeed. Rather, "since the writ was not constitutionally granted in positive terms in many state constitutions, and [was] only recognized indirectly by a limitation
placed upon the authority to suspend its operations," the
Framers naturally assumed "that the non-suspension clause
also functioned in oblique fashion, implicitly conferring the
right of the privilege." (Milton Cantor, The Writ of Habeas
Corpus: EarlyAmerican Origins and Development,
FREEDOM AND REFORM, 55, 76-77 (Harold M. Hyman &
Leonard W. Levy eds., 1967.)
These propositions should be (and among scholars are)
uncontroversial; but courts and lawyers must confront John
Marshall's opinion in Ex Parte Bollmnm, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
75 (1807). That case
involved some of the
alleged coconspirators in
sid
what the government
charged was a plot by
Aaron Burr to separate
western regions of the
United States from their
allegiance to the republic.
Like Burr, Marshall was
politically hostile to
President Thomas Jefferson. But the president's Republican
party controlled both houses of Congress. So Marshall was
in a risky position. Releasing the defendants would certainly upset the other branches, and might lead to some sort of
retaliation against the Court. Indeed, less than two years
had passed since Burr himself had presided over the Senate
impeachment trial of Justice Samuel Chase. And although
that had resulted in an acquittal, the justices had certainly
heard the message.
Deciding Ex ParteBollman in this context, Marshall
moved carefully. His ruling released the prisoners, but
added the superfluous observation that the Court had no
inherent authority to grant the writ; it could only exercise
the habeas powers Congress may have supplied.
But suppose that Congress had done nothing to provide
the courts with authority to grant the writ? Marshall's view
was that in that case the prisoners would have had no judicial recourse. What then of the Suspension Clause? That
provision, according to Marshall, was merely an exhortation to Congress to make statutory provision for the writ.
Fortunately, he continued in a flattering passage of dicta,
Congress had heeded the call in the case before him.
"Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction,"
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the first Congress, "must have felt with peculiar force, the
obligation of providing efficient means by which this great
constitutional privilege should receive life and activity; for
if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would
be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted." (Bollman, supra, 8 U.S. at 95.)
This obiter was not only gratuitous, but deeply flawed.
(See ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHTNKING THE
GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 36-41 (NYU Press, 2001).)
Marshall himself had written just a few years before that
there was universal agreement that "on adopting the existing constitution of the United States the common and
statute law of each state
remained as before & that the
principles of the common law
of the state woud apply themselves to magistrates of the
I
general as well as to magistrates of the particular government." (Letter from John
Marshall to St. George Tucker
(Nov. 27, 1800) in 6 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL

be correct under the Constitution. The Suspension Clause
was designed to constrain Congress, so an interpretation
putting Congress in complete control of the writ would
make scant sense. Rather, the appropriate rule would be the
one Marshall had rejected: that the Court had inherent
power to issue the writ unless and until Congress suspended
it, in which case the legislative action would be subject to
judicial review in normal course.
Confronted with this dilemma, the Court ducked, andconstruing the statute so as to avoid constitutional doubtread the statutory provision "Review by Habeas Corpus
Precluded" as not precluding habeas corpus review. The
Court held that because
Congress had, in fact, provided the writ, there was no need
to rule on whether its failure
to do so would constitute a
suspension.
Answering that grave
question, the Court declared,
should await another occasion. And in response to
Justice Scalia's outraged
protestation that Bollman had
already resolved the issue, the
majority blandly misquoted Marshall. Thus, the Court on
that day managed to get the Constitution right, although
Marshall wrong. Although this was certainly better than
Justice Scalia's outcome, which got Marshall right but the
Constitution wrong, the state of affairs is not just unstable
but potentially dangerous to constitutional liberty. (See
Freedman, supra, at 3-4).
Indeed, in a decision a few days after St. Cyr, the Court
noted that it was not dealing with the specific problems that
might be posed in the context of the detention of alleged
terrorists, thus postponing a decision of precisely the issue
that might arise under a future statute (see Zadvydas v.
Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2502 (2001)).
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23 (Charles F. Hobson ed.,
1990).) Thus, the Framers
expected that even if Congress were to fail to enact statutory habeas corpus provisions, the federal courts would have
common law or state law powers to issue the writ.
As Bollman's counsel argued, adducing a powerful array
of historical and legal authority, "the power of issuing writs
of habeas corpus, for the purpose of relieving from illegal
imprisonment, is one of those inherent powers, bestowed by
the law upon every superior court of record, as incidental to
its nature, for the protection of the citizen." (Bollman,
supra, 8 U.S. at 79.)
For many years, however, no case emerged in which it
was necessary for the Court to reexamine Marshall's hortatory view of the nature of the writ. So it lay to hand as a
dangerous weapon that might potentially be employed
against disfavored groups.

St Cyr: afortunate misfire
In reforming the immigration laws in 1996, Congress
sought to use the weapon. The statute revising the provisions for the confinement of aliens contained a section
headed "Review by Habeas Corpus Precluded," and tried to
create a new class of prisoners who, by the law creating
their status, would not have access to judicial review of
their detentions.
Facing a challenge to this enactment last Term in INS v.
St. Cyr, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (2001), the Court found itself in a
delicate situation. Under Bollman's view, the congressional
action would seem to be legitimate. But that could hardly
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The role of lawyers
The first and best defense against regressive congressional legislation is for concerned individuals and groups to
take every opportunity to drive home to our representatives
the message that due process is not optional, nor are its
advocates apologists for terrorism.
To be sure, we have an attorney general who chillingly
says to those who raise civil liberties concerns: "My message is this: your tactics aid only terrorists, for they erode
our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give
ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to America's
friends." But that is all the more reason for our legislators,
so often the beneficiaries of the protections afforded by our
justice system, to be leaders in pointing out that the preser-
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vation of those safeguards is a powerful weapon against
our enemies and an inspiration to our friends.
Is it unrealistic to expect this from our representatives?
Consider the words of Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio) in a
speech during the depths of World War 11.
As a matter of general principle, I believe there can be no doubt
that criticism in time of war is essential to the maintenance of
any kind of democratic government.... [Too many people desire to suppress criticism simply because they think it will give
some comfort to the enemy to know that there is such criticism. If that comfort makes the enemy feel better for a few
moments, they are welcome to it as far as I am concerned because the maintenance of the right of criticism in the long run
will do the country maintaining it a great deal more good than
it will do the enemy, and will prevent mistakes which might
otherwise occur.
(2 THE PAPERS OF ROBERT A. TAFT 303 (Clarence E.
Wunderlin ed., 1997).)
Still, Congress is not a body renowned for its political
courage. If it chooses to follow the policy it announced

with respect to habeas corpus for illegal immigrants in
1996, then lawyers must urge courts at every level to repudiate John Marshall's politically inspired Bolhnan dicta
that invented the hortatory theory of the Suspension
Clause.
Only in this way can the judicial branch play its rightful
role as a check on potential governmental abuses of power
and be true to what Justice Brennan once rightly described
as "the root principle" of habeas corpus: "[T]hat in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to
the judiciary for a man's imprisonment." (Fay v: Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 402 (1963).)

Conclusion
Every one of us, whether or not a government official,
should take to heart the words of Benjamin Franklin,
"There is not in any volume, the sacred writings excepted,
a passage to be found better worth the veneration of
freemen than this: 'They that can give up essential liberty
to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty or
safety.'" U

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 0 Summer

2002

